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We augment a standard tax model by concerns about tax equity: people get upset when labour 
is taxed more heavily than capital. Even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the 
common recommendation for small open economies that capital should remain tax-exempt. 
This holds for exogenous as well as for endogenous government expenditures and irrespective 
of whether concerns with tax equity only cause emotional discomfort or also impact on work 
incentives. If concerns with tax equity get more intense, the economy may choose higher 
taxes on labour and move to the downward sloped part of its Laffer curve. For endogenous 
government spending, stronger concerns with tax equity may call for a larger size of the 
public sector. 
JEL-Code: H20, E62, P16, Z10. 
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A fundamental theorem on taxation states that small open economies should not rely on capital
taxation. This result, originally derived in Gordon (1986), emerges from the assumption of an
inﬁnitely elastic capital supply which small countries face. Under this assumption, the burden
of a tax on capital will be entirely shifted onto workers or other immobile domestic factors. But
if those factors bear the tax burden anyway, it is less costly to tax them directly and, by this,
to avoid the excess burden associated with capital ﬂight.
Zero capital taxation, thus, is optimal in this class of models – it maximizes the representative
household’s utility and is also the policy outcome that people actually want and would vote
for. However, in reality the prospect of zero taxes on capital hardly looks popular. It ﬂies in
the face of all sorts of concerns with equity, fairness, and equal treatment in taxation – which
remain unmodelled in the standard framework of optimal (international) taxation. Over the
past decades a large body of evidence has been compiled suggesting that people not only care
for, or are solely driven by, material self-interest but also by values, norms and equity concerns.
Such ethical preferences have been embedded into various economic contexts, but only little is
known about the optimal tax structure when ethical norms are related to taxation.
In this paper, we analyse optimal taxation in the presence of tax equity norms, i.e., when citizens
hold the view that tax rates on capital and labour incomes ought not to diﬀer too widely. Such
an approach can be motivated along several lines:
• First, tax systems that exclusively or disproportionately rely on taxes on labour incomes
appear unacceptable on grounds of common norms for equity and justice.1 The most
general and fundamental of such norms is reﬂected in the principle of horizontal tax equity,
to which most tax systems pay at least lip service. Stating that equal incomes should be
taxed at equal rates (Musgrave, 1959; Kaplow, 1995), the principle forms part of the
rationale underlying the comprehensive income tax (of the Schanz-Haig-Simons type),
a normative ideal to which many countries (used to) adhere.2 Discrimination between
similarly situated tax payers – such as zero or low taxes on capital in the presence of
positive and high tax rates on labour – clearly violates this principle. Such discrimination
also violates its relative, the ability-to-pay principle, stating that all members of society
have a duty to pay taxes in accordance with their economic capabilities; tax legislation
warps this principle when tax privileges are not based on ability to pay.3
1For a survey on tax equity norms and their implications for actual tax policy see, e.g., Barker (2006).
2These aspects also matter in the debate on dual income taxes: by applying diﬀerent tax treatments to incomes
from diﬀerent sources, dual income tax generate problems of horizontal inequity. See, e.g., Sørensen (1994).
3Moreover, burdening only one subgroup of the population (i.e., workers) could also be in conﬂict with the beneﬁt
principle of taxation, stating that the taxes an agent pays should somehow reﬂect the beneﬁts that (s)he receives
from the goods and services supplied by the state (for a discussion of the beneﬁt and sacriﬁce principles of
1• Second, equity does not only matter from the abstract perspective of a philosopher. Rather,
the experimental literature provides ample evidence that perceptions of “fairness” and its
violation indeed and signiﬁcantly impact on individuals’ subjective well-being as well as
on individuals’ behaviour (for a survey see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). From a citizen’s
perspective equity constitutes an important criterion for the legitimacy of a tax system;
it shapes tax compliance (Bordignon, 1993), political support (Taylor, 2003, p. 84) and
work incentives. Boadway et al. (2007) argue that individuals hold personal views on what
constitutes an ethical tax rate; discrepancies between actual and ethically acceptable tax
rates may induce individuals to (legally) avoid taxation by adjusting their labour supply.
Hence, hurt ethical feelings may give rise to tax distortions.
• Third, zero or low tax rates on capital income in the presence of high tax rates on labour
income cause discontent and envy. The rich, capital income earners or proﬁtable businesses
getting away without being taxed adequately makes wage earners with (perceived) high
tax burdens angry (The Economist, 2009). The “common man”, paying a substantial
share of his moderate income in taxes, is upset when – as it happens in many countries –
capital incomes are subject to rather symbolic income or capital gains taxes, exempt from
contributing to social insurance, and given various preferences and privileges. Likewise,
the (perception of a) growing imbalance in the taxation of labour and capital incomes
(allegedly induced by globalisation) nourishes political discomfort. Generally, policies that
discriminate across comparable circumstances or individuals appear to create resentment,
possibly also endangering social stability. This view ﬁnds strong support in the socio-
psychological literature which shows that relative deprivation – via unequal treatment,
exclusion, or discrimination – negatively impacts both on individual well-being and on
social cohesion and welfare (Runciman, 1966; Podder, 1996).4 As argued by Elster (1991,
p. 66) in general and by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978, p. 590) for taxation, a society that
tries to assuage its envy may well adopt policies that damage its material interests.
• Fourth, large discrepancies between taxes on capital and labour may indicate a high de-
gree of inequality which might be detrimental for utility (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
Reducing inequality is a major rationale for taxation in modern societies, and the exemp-
tion from taxation or low tax rates for capital incomes and fortunes let the social compact
for redistribution appear shaky – which many people ﬁnd undesirable (Brooks and Manza
2006). Concerns over inequality have mainly been studied in the context of the progressiv-
taxation see, e.g., Neill, 2000). Since everybody beneﬁts from the provision of public goods, the beneﬁt principle
calls (as a minimum) for a positive share in taxes for everyone.
4While economists tend to reduce relative deprivation to shortfalls of income or consumption, Runciman’s original
concept is far wider and applicable to abstract or intangible social objects, including policy measures such as
tax rates.
2ity of income taxes (see, e.g., Snyder and Kramer, 1988). Recently, however, Kim (2007)
embedded fairness considerations in form of inequality aversion into a Ramsey-Mirrlees
framework of optimal taxation, making the case for a substantial taxation of capital.5
To summarize, people seem to care about the tax structure in itself (and beyond the extent by
which it aﬀects their own net incomes). They ﬁnd it important that tax rates on diﬀerent factors
or types of income do not diﬀer too much. Tax rate diﬀerentials aﬀect individual well-being via
concerns for equity, equality, and sentiments of relative deprivation or envy. In this paper we
analyze the implications of such concerns for the tax structures in small open economies. To
keep terminology simple, we shall henceforth and invariably refer to tax-related sentiments as
“tax equity concerns”. This term is an imperfect container for a wide range of diﬀerent concepts
that partially overlap and are diﬃcult to disentangle (norms for horizontal tax equity, envy,
fairness perceptions, feelings of relative deprivation or discrimination, status concerns etc.).
Their common denominator is, however, that large discrepancies between tax rates on diﬀerent
types of income are undesirable. From a modelling perspective, holding a tax equity norms
mean that tax rates (or the tax structure) directly into one’s utility function, independently of
whether material well-being is aﬀected or not.
Concerns for tax equity may matter in at least two diﬀerent ways: Perceiving a situation as
more inequitable may cause discomfort and reduce the level of well-being (level eﬀect), but
it may also trigger adjustments in labour supply (incentive eﬀects). The motivation for the
inclusion of incentive eﬀetcs comes from empirical and experimental evidence suggesting that
unfairness felt in the context of taxation indeed aﬀects work incentives. Dissatisﬁed individuals
spend less eﬀort on work, show higher rates of absenteeism etc. (see, e.g., L´ evy-Garboua et al.,
2009; Cornelissen et al., 2010, or in a theoretical framework, Boadway et al., 2007). In social
psychology, adverse behavioural reactions of this type have since long been discussed under the
label “equity theory” (Adams, 1963). In our model, level eﬀects of tax equity concerns formally
show up in preferences as (separable) reductions in total utility while incentive eﬀects aﬀect
marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure.
We embed these tax equity concerns into a model of a small open economy whose remaining
components are fairly standard: A single output is produced with labour and capital. Capital is
perfectly mobile internationally. Workers are immobile but their supply of labour is endogenous
(and may be aﬀected by equity concerns). Higher levels of capital imply higher equilibrium
5Another potential argument why unequal tax rates are disliked may indirectly enter via relative-income concerns
(Luttmer, 2005; Layard 2006). If individual well-being depends, in addition to the absolute level of own income,
also on one’s income position relative to others and taxation changes these relative positions, then tax privileges
(for earners of capital income, say) may be detrimental to utility (of wage earners, say). We do not follow this
route here. With status concerns, the reference point for the assessment of taxes is not a general standard but
an interpersonal comparison whose normative relevance is unclear.
3wages. The government provides a consumption good and ﬁnances its expenditures with lin-
ear source taxes on capital and labour income. The level of government expenditure can be
exogenously given or might be chosen optimally.
In the absence of concerns for tax equity, government ﬁnance should exclusively rely on labour
income taxes. Capital taxation causes a higher excess burden, irrespectively of whether govern-
ment expenditures are exogenous or endogenous. An optimum without concerns for tax equity,
thus, involves a large diﬀerential tax treatment of capital and labour.
In the presence of equity concerns, however, the tax designer faces a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand,
there is the standard excess burden: taxes on capital drive capital out of the country and, by
this, also depress gross wages. On the other hand, at given (and relatively high) labour tax
rates, they reduce the tax gap and thereby placate equity concerns. This trade-oﬀ has a number
of implications for optimal tax policies, some expected, some perhaps less so.
First, exempting capital income from taxation is never optimal. Already with the slightest
concern for tax equity a zero tax rate on capital income ceases to be optimal, irrespectively of
whether equity concerns impact on work incentives or “only” on well-being. Second, and more
surprising, stronger concerns for tax equity may indeed call for a higher level of labour taxation.
One reason is that equity concerns may drive the economy onto the decreasing part of the partial
Laﬀer curve for the capital tax – a situation that would never occur within a standard framework
of taxation. Another reason is that government ﬁnance via capital taxes may eventually carry
so large an excess burden that a further increase of capital taxes, induced by stronger equity
concerns, needs to be accommodated by an (smaller) increase in labour taxes. Third, also the
comparative statics for government expenditures reveal some interesting non-monotonicities.
One might expect that a stronger concern for tax equity calls for higher capital tax rates and,
by this, for a smaller public sector (capital taxation being plagued by a larger excess burden).
However, even when the former is true, the size of the public sector need not necessarily decline.
Tax equity concerns erode the size of the public sector only when they are relatively weak. If
strong equity concerns grow even more intense, higher government expenditure can be desirable.
Our paper contributes to the theory of taxation in two areas. First, it complements a small
literature that incorporates values and equity norms into optimal tax frameworks.6 Most of this
literature is concerned with the impact of equity perceptions on tax compliance, but some recent
theoretical and experimental research also deals with the interaction between inequity aversion
(in the Fehr-Schmidt sense) and tax structures (see, e.g., Kim 2007, or L´ evy-Garboua et al.,
2009). Second, we add to recent research on the optimal mix of capital and labour taxation in
6The literature on social preferences often assumes that individuals compare their own income position to that of
others. If such comparisons entail negative externalities (via envy, say), Pigouvian taxes may be helpful remedies
(see, e.g., Alvarez-Cuadrado 2007; Alonso-Carrera et al. 2006). By contrast, in our framework unequal taxation
is a source of disutility – and not a remedy against it.
4open economies which is puzzled by the failure of empirical studies to conﬁrm the theoretical
prediction that increased capital mobility leads to a lower relative tax burden on capital (see
Hauﬂer, 1997, or Hauﬂer et al., 2008). Our paper suggests that concerns with tax equity may
have prevented such a race to the bottom for capital taxes; the social value of balanced taxation
may outweigh the economic beneﬁts from low capital taxes.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out a basic model with tax equity concerns. In
Section 3, we analyze tax policies and their comparative statics for the case that government
spending is exogenous. In Section 4, we extend the model to endogenous government spending.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a small open one-good economy which is inhabited by a large number of identical
individuals. For simplicity, we normalize the number of individuals to unity. Production in the
economy takes place in one single-output ﬁrm that is owned by absent foreigners. It uses labour
and capital as its inputs. Capital is an internationally mobile factor of production that can be
purchased on world capital markets at an exogenous rental rate of r > 0 per unit. Capital and
labour can be taxed with constant average tax rates tℓ for labour and tk for capital. Taxation
is only source-based.
The individual has convex and increasing preferences over consumption c, leisure – which will
be negatively represented by working hours ℓ –, and a publicly provided good g. We assume
that these preferences can be represented by an additively separable utility function
u(c,ℓ) = c − E(ℓ,ψ) + h(g) − Ω, (1)
where E(·) with Eℓ > 0 and Eℓℓ > 0 represents the disutility from labour ℓ and h(g) with
h′(g) > 0 > h′′(g) measures the utility from the publicly provided good.
The special features of preferences in our model are functions Ω and ψ, both of which are
assumed to depend on the tax rates on labour and capital:
Ω = Ω(tℓ,tk) and ψ = ψ(tℓ,tk).
Preferences, thus, directly depend on the policy choices made in the society. Speciﬁcally, Ω
captures that the level of individual well-being may be aﬀected by the tax structure. We assume
that
Ωℓ := ∂Ω/∂tℓ ≥ 0 and Ωk := ∂Ω/∂tk ≤ 0.
Hence, individuals welcome lower taxes on labour and higher taxes on capital. In spite of this
asymmetric treatment of tk and tℓ in Ω (and also below in ψ), we can interpret Ω (and ψ) as
concerns for tax equity. In our framework, we will only encounter situations where capital is
5taxed less severely than labour. On this domain, preference functions such as Ω can reﬂect
that any widening of the statutory tax gap (tℓ − tk) is welfare reducing. Viz., as a special case
(sometimes used below), Ω could be written as
Ω = ˜ Ω(β · (tℓ − tk))
with ˜ Ω′ > 0; the parameter β > 0 would then measure the intensity of the equity concern.
The function ψ in (1) captures that tax equity concerns may generate incentive eﬀects: the
disutility from work not only varies with working hours ℓ but also with the individual’s perception
ψ of tax policies. We assume that both the absolute and the marginal disutility from labour
increases whenever the tax policy is perceived to be less fair (Eψ > 0, Eℓψ > 0). Moreover, we
assume that ψ = ψ(tℓ,tk) with
ψℓ := ∂ψ/∂tℓ ≥ 0 and ψk := ∂ψ/∂tk ≤ 0, (2)
reﬂecting that higher taxes on labour (weakly) depress work morale while higher taxes on capital
boost it. As with Ω, this asymmetric treatment does not preclude the interpretation of ψ as
an ethical norm; we operate on a policy domain where tk < tℓ. Experimental evidence for the
validity of (2) can be found in L´ evy-Garboua et al. (2009) where it is shown that workers who
consider equity norms to be violated by taxation refuse to work.
As discussed in the introduction, the labelling of both ψ and Ω as equity concerns covers a wide
array of aﬀects, ranging from abstract horizontal equity norms to envy to feelings of relative
deprivation. The distinction between Ω and ψ reﬂects two channels of tax equity: a work
morale eﬀect (ψ alters the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption) and
a “feel-good” eﬀect (Ω aﬀects well-being but leaves incentives untouched).
In (1) we take the perspective of a worker without capital income. Moreover, (1) does not entail
any status concerns, comparisons with reference groups or comparisons of actual tax payments;
the direct preference over tax structures is purely an (individual) ethic norm.
The legal incidence of labour taxes is assumed to lie with workers. Thus, the disposable income
of a worker just equals the hourly net wage (w − tℓ) times hours worked: c = (w − tℓ) · ℓ. The
(gross) wage rate w will be endogenously determined (see below).
Individuals take the wage and tax rate as parametrically given when deciding on their labour
supply. Substituting for c in (1) and maximizing over ℓ requires that:
Eℓ(ℓ,ψ(tℓ,tk)) = w − tℓ. (3)


















· ψk > 0. (6)
Firms maximize their proﬁts. Denoting by K and L, respectively, the amounts of capital and
labour employed in the ﬁrm, output of the ﬁrm equals F(K,L), where F is a strictly increasing,
constant-returns-to-scale and strictly quasi-concave production function. Firms pay a tax tk on
each unit of capital they hire. Since the cost of hiring an additional hour of labour are w while
an additional unit of capital costs r + tk, the ﬁrm’s net proﬁts amount to
π = F(K,L) − w · L − (r + tk) · K = L · (f(k) − w − (r + tk) · k). (7)
Here, k := K/L denotes capital per labour unit and f(k) is the per-unit-of-labour production
function; f is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The ﬁrm takes input prices and taxes as
given. Proﬁt maximization requires
f′(k) = r + tk, (8)
which implicitly deﬁnes the capital intensity k = k(r + tk) as a function of the cost of capital,
with




Since we assume constant returns to scale, the gross wage rate is determined via the factor price
frontier and is given by
w(r + tk) = f(k) − (r + t) · k (10)
with
w′(r + tk) = −k. (11)
In equilibrium, labour supply must equal labour demand. The equilibrium level L∗ of employ-
ment is, thus, given by
L∗(tℓ,tk) = ℓS(w(r + tk),tℓ,tk); (12)






















7Note that when equity concerns are suﬃciently high, they may oﬀset the usual disincentive from
higher capital taxation on labour supply. In this case, equilibrium employment would increase
in the tax rate on labour.
The government provides a (public) good g (measured in units of output) which has to be
ﬁnanced out of the revenues from labour and capital taxes. Hence, its budget constraint reads:
g = tℓ · L∗ + tk · K = L∗(tℓ,tk) · (tℓ + tk · k(r + tk)) =: G(tℓ,tk). (13)
In what follows, we shall refer to G(tℓ,tk) as the Laﬀer curve of the economy. For later use, we













· (tℓ + tkk) + L∗ =: Gℓ. (15)
3 Optimal tax policy with exogenous government spending
In this section, we assume that a given and ﬁxed level of government revenues ¯ g has to be raised;
the case of endogenous government expenditures will be dealt with in Section 4.
3.1 Some taxation of capital is optimal
The government chooses tℓ and tk such as to maximize individual welfare (recall that ﬁrm owners
are absentee capitalists). Plugging the equilibrium level of employment L∗ and (13) into (1) and
taking into account that w = w(r + tk) via (10), we obtain indirect utility (= social welfare) in
equilibrium as follows:
V (tℓ,tk) := (w(r + tk) − tℓ) · L∗(tℓ,tk) − E(L∗(tℓ,tk),ψ(tℓ,tk)) − Ω(tℓ,tk). (16)
As government expenditures g are exogenously ﬁxed, the utility h(g) derived from them does
not matter here; it is omitted from (16). The government chooses tax rates tℓ and tk such as to
maximize V subject to the revenue constraint. The Lagrangian W for this problem reads:
max
tℓ,tk
W(tℓ,tk) = V (tℓ,tk) + λ · [G(tℓ,tk) − ¯ g], (17)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier and ¯ g the exogenous level of the public good to be




= −L∗ + λ · Gℓ − Eψ · ψℓ − Ωℓ
= L∗ · [λ − 1] + λ · (tℓ + tkk) ·
∂L∗
∂tℓ
− Eψ · ψℓ − Ωℓ (18)
∂W
∂tk
= w′(r + tk)L∗ + λ · Gk − Eψ · ψk − Ωk
= kL∗ · [λ − 1] + λ ·
 





− Eψ · ψk − Ωk. (19)
No concerns for tax equity. As a benchmark, we consider the case without tax equity































for all (tℓ,tk) with tk > 0. Hence, without equity concerns it can never be optimal to tax capital
at source: tk = 0.7 The intuition for this standard result is that a small country faces a ﬁxed
rate of return on capital and, thereby, an inﬁnitely elastic capital supply. Capital taxes would
then be entirely shifted over to the immobile factor, which makes it less costly to tax this factor
directly (Razin and Sadka, 1991; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991).
Disutility from unequal tax rates. First, consider the case where concerns for tax equity
only aﬀect utility levels (Ωk ≤ 0,Ωℓ ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality) but do not have any

















This equation diﬀers from (21) only by the term −Ωℓ+Ωk/k < 0, implying that zero taxation of
capital is no longer desirable: at tk = 0 and ∂W
∂tℓ = 0, we get ∂W
∂tk > 0 instead of ∂W
∂tk = 0 such that
a positive tk is warranted. Intuitively, with preferences for equal taxation, capital taxation not
only has economics costs (distortion of the capital intensity), but also reduces the psychological







Ωk − Ωℓ) (23)
must hold in a welfare maximum.
7Formally, if
∂V
∂tℓ = 0, one gets
∂V
∂tk < 0 for all tk > 0 such that a reduction of tk is worthwhile.
9Incentive eﬀects. Suppose now that deviations from the tax equity norm do not cause a
deterioration in utility per se, but distort the incentives to provide labour. I.e., we shall assume
that ψk(tℓ,tk) ≤ 0 ≤ ψℓ(tℓ,tk) with at least one strict inequality, while we reset Ωk = Ωℓ ≡ 0.













· (k + Eℓψ · ψk). (24)


















      
< 0
. (25)
This again implies that no taxation of capital can never be optimal: For any (tℓ,tk) = (tℓ,0), we
get ∂V
∂tk > k · ∂V

















Result 1 In the absence of tax equity concerns, capital should remain untaxed. In the presence
of equity concerns, whether they shape incentives or just aﬀect utility levels, a zero tax rate on
capital is never optimal.
Result 1 shows that the standard recommendation that small open economies should leave
capital untaxed balances on a knife’s edge. Any eﬀect providing capital taxation with some
extra marginal beneﬁt induces the government to rely on at least some capital taxation. Here,
concerns for tax equity do the job.
3.2 Comparative statics with level eﬀects
The inclusion of tax equity considerations provides governments with incentives to levy positive
capital tax rates. But precisely how does the strength of equity concerns aﬀect optimal tax
policy? To answer this, we ﬁrst consider the case where tax equity concerns do not impact on
work incentives (i.e., ψ is a constant). To be able to measure the intensity of equity concerns, we
suppose that equity concerns are assuaged as soon as the diﬀerence between capital and labour
tax rates narrows. Then Ω Ω only depends on the gap between labour and capital tax rates:
Ω = ˜ Ω(β · (tℓ − tk)) (27)
10with ˜ Ω′ > 0 and ˜ Ω′′ ≥ 0. Parameter β > 0 then serves as a parametric measure for the strength




























with Wxy = ∂2W/(∂tx∂ty) and Wxβ = ∂2W/(∂tx∂β). From (18), (19), and (27) we get that
Wkβ = −Wℓβ = Ωℓβ := ˜ Ω′ + β(tℓ − tk) · ˜ Ω′′ > 0 (28)
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· Ωℓβ · (Gk + Gℓ)2. (31)
Here,
D = 2GkGℓWℓk − (G2
kWℓℓ + G2
ℓWkk)
is the determinant of the bordered Hessian on the LHS of (28). In a welfare maximum, D > 0
as well as Wkk,Wℓℓ < 0.
Observe from (28) that the weak assumption ˜ Ω′ > 0 (the individual feels worse the larger the tax
rate diﬀerential) suﬃces to have equity concerns aﬀect tax policies – we do not strictly need to
assume that ˜ Ω′′ ≥ 0 (the psychological costs of tax inequity increase more than proportionately
with the tax gap).
As can be seen immediately from (31), a stronger concern for tax equity has an unambiguous
eﬀect on the tax rate diﬀerential: (tℓ − tk) is strictly decreasing in β, irrespective of the signs
of the partial derivatives of the Laﬀer curve (Gℓ, Gk). Starting from tℓ > tk = 0 at β = 0, the




To determine the signs of (29) and (30), we manipulate these expressions in the following way.











in an interior equilibrium. Observe from (18) that Gℓ > 0 in an optimum. Substituting for Gℓ


















  0, (33)
where Ωk/λ < 0. Thus, the eﬀects from stronger tax equity concerns on the labour tax rate are
unclear in sign. If Gk > 0, the labour tax decreases with the strength of the equity concern. This
accords with intuition: the more upset workers are with privileged capital taxation, the lower
the tax burden they are willing to accept on their own incomes. However, the counter-intuitive
case, that a stronger desire to correct for tax inequity is associated with higher labour taxation
may also occur. This can happen if Gk < 0, i.e. if the economy is on the downward-sloped part
of the Laﬀer curve of the capital tax rate (given that Gℓ and, from (32), Gk−
Ωk
λ are positive). In
Example 1 below we will show that under certain conditions government in fact has an incentive
to push the economy beyond the maximum of the (partial) Laﬀer-curve for the capital tax.



















This expression is positive, irrespective of the sign of Gk. Thus, we get a monotonic increase of




The observation that the tax on labour may increase when tax equity concerns grow stronger
deserves an explanation. An increase in β calls for a higher tk. If tk is high enough, this will
ceteris paribus cause tax revenues to drop (Gk < 0), due to a reduction both in the capital stock
and wages. As revenue shortfalls are not allowed with an exogenous budget requirement, the
tax on labour consequently has to rise (but at a lower pace than the capital tax rate as (tℓ −tk)
is bound to decrease).
To see that
dtℓ
dβ might indeed be an optimal policy response, have a look at
Example 1. In this and the following examples, we consider a Cobb-Douglas technology
where per-capita output is produced according to y = kα. We parameterize the disutility
from labour by E = 0.5 · ψ · ℓ2. The disutility from tax rate diﬀerentials is assumed to follow
Ω = 0.5 · β · (tℓ − tk)2. The parameter α, capital’s share of output, is set equal to 0.25. The
“dislove for work” parameter, ψ, is set to 0.1, and the world market’s rental rate, r, to 0.25.
Figure 1 depicts optima for diﬀerent values of β.
Each graph plots tax indiﬀerence curves for V (tℓ,tk) (dashed curves) and a government iso-
budget contour (solid lines) in (tℓ,tk)-space. The aspired revenue level and (since there are no
incentive eﬀects) the iso-budget contours for the government are the same in all panels. The
12(lower leg of the) iso-budget contour is negatively sloped for moderate capital tax rates: a higher
capital tax entails higher tax revenues and, thus, allows for a lower tax rate on labour to meet
the budget requirement. However, eventually the negative eﬀect of a higher capital tax rate on
tax revenues (a lower tax base induced by capital ﬂight) dominates, such that the same level
of g can only be met at higher taxes on labour. The shape of the V -indiﬀerence curves varies
across the four panels of Figure 1 with the strength β of the tax equity concern. For zero or low
values of β indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped since individuals place high emphasis on
the adverse eﬀects of capital taxation on consumption (w′ < 0). For β = 0 both the labour and
the capital tax rate are considered as “bads” – while tℓ adversely aﬀects consumption via lower
net wages, a higher tk depresses gross wages. Indiﬀerence curves closer to the origin represent
higher utility levels. With increasing concerns for tax equity, indiﬀerence curves bend upwards.
Closing the tax gap is increasingly considered as good, and losses in material consumption can
be less easily compensated for by a lower tax burden on labour income.8
Geometrically the indiﬀerence curve at an optimal tax mix must be tangent to the (lower leg of
the) iso-budget contour representing the exogenous revenue requirement ¯ g. In the benchmark
case (β = 0), this point of tangency is on the vertical axis where capital is tax exempt. Starting
from such a position, the point of tangency moves along the budget contour towards the 45◦-
line. This initially entails a reduction of tℓ and an increase in tk. However, with equity concerns
strong enough, eventually the upward-sloped part of the iso-budget contour might be entered.
The optimal tax mix then leads the economy on the downward-sloped part of the (partial) Laﬀer
for the capital tax rate (where Gk < 0). Thus, it is shown that (
dtℓ
dβ > 0) is possible.9
Equity concerns call for narrowing the spread between labour and capital taxation. Indeed, if it is
possible to ﬁnance the exogenous revenue requirement at equal tax rates (the iso-budget contour
intersects with the diagonal), tℓ = tk will eventually be implemented when equity concerns β
grow strong enough. Such tax rate equalization need not be feasible, in particular not when
budget requirements are suﬃciently high. An economy with strong tax equity motives will then
(geometrically) remain at that situation on the iso-budget contour that lies at minimal distance





We sum up the general ﬁndings of this section in
Result 2 Suppose that individual well-being decreases when the gap between the tax rates on
capital and labour widens.
1. A more intense concern for tax equity calls for a higher tax on capital and for a more
8In the extreme, when tax equity concern becomes overwhelmingly strong, indiﬀerence curves would be linear
with slope +1 and the highest utility level is represented by the 45
◦-line. All tax combinations along the 45
◦-line
are then considered as equally good.
9Formally, the tax mix (tk,tℓ) that is at minimum distance to the 45
◦-line satisﬁes, on the iso-budget contour for
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β = 2.1 β = 13
Figure 1: Tax equity without incentive eﬀects. Government iso-budget contour (solid) and
indiﬀerence curves (dashed) for varying values of β.
narrow gap between capital and labour tax rate.
2. Starting from weak levels, a strengthening of tax equity concerns calls for a lower tax on
labour. However, if equity concerns become suﬃciently strong, the optimal tax rate on
labour may eventually increase. This occurs if and only if, at the optimal tax mix, the
economy operates on the decreasing part of the Laﬀer curve for the capital tax.10
The signiﬁcant (economic) ineﬃciency identiﬁed in the last eﬀect in item b) is interesting in
itself. Already Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) conjectured that the inclusion of social preferences
(in their case: concerns about relative consumption) potentially removes the economic barriers
for increasing tax rates to the point where disincentive eﬀects actually reduce tax revenues.
10The economy will never operate on the downward-sloped part of its total Laﬀer curve (Gℓ,Gk both negative);
Gℓ must be positive from the FOC (18).
14Tax equity concerns provide a case in point here. In an alternative interpretation the equity
norm may represent tax envy. Then the choice of economically questionable tax policies (i.e.,
operating in the decreasing part of the Laﬀer curve) is reminiscent of Elster’s (1991, p. 66)
warning that assuaging its envy may come at the expense of a society’s substantial economic
interests.11
It is informative to study how the level of equilibrium labour supply L∗(tℓ,tk) varies with the



























































Corollary 1 People in an economy with more intense concerns for tax equity work less.
This observation should be interpreted against the backdrop that the equity norm itself does
not exert any incentive eﬀects (in the present scenario). The impact of tax equity concerns on
labour supply is entirely indirect, via the attending optimal tax structure.
3.3 Comparative statics with incentive eﬀects
Now we turn to the eﬀects of stronger fairness concerns when tax equity concerns impact on
work incentives (i.e., ψℓ > 0 > ψk but Ωℓ = Ωk ≡ 0). This change aﬀects indiﬀerence maps for
V (tℓ,tk) as well as the iso-budget contour G(tℓ,tk) = ¯ g – which now changes its shape when
equity concerns vary.
For low levels of equity concerns, the eﬀects are similar as in the “level eﬀect”-scenario of the
previous section: starting from tk = 0, stronger equity concerns call for raising tk and lowering
tℓ. Eventually, higher equity concerns may call for an increase in the labour tax rate tℓ. However,
unlike in the previous scenario, this does neither imply nor necessitate that the economy is on
the decreasing leg of its Laﬀer curve. We demonstrate this in
11L´ evy-Garboua et al. (2009) experimentally show that workers who respond sensitively to violations of a tax
equity norm refuse to work. This implies that higher tax rates (viz., more severe violations of the equity norm)
lead to decreasing tax revenues. This undesirable Laﬀer curve eﬀect has to be clearly distinguished from our
observation where it may be optimal to bring the economy on the downward-sloped side of the (partial) Laﬀer
curve.
12The positive sign of the bracketed expression is implied by Gℓ > 0 in (32).
15Example 2. As above, preferences are parameterized by u = c−0.5·ψ ·ℓ2. But now ψ is not
a constant but a function given by
ψ = ψ0 + 0.5 · β · (tℓ − tk)2. (35)
The level of spending is again exogenously ﬁxed. Throughout the numerical examples, we set
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Figure 2: Tax equity with incentive eﬀects. Government iso-budget contours (solid) and indif-
ference curves (dashed) for varying values of β.
The four panels in Figure 2 depict the government iso-budget contour (solid line) and indiﬀerence
curves (dashed lines) for diﬀerent values of β. Unlike in Figure 1, the iso-budget contours vary
with the strength of the equity norm. They move into the direction of the 45◦-line in (tℓ,tk)-
space and tend to bend upwards when β increases. The reason is that (starting from a situation
with tℓ > tk) a higher capital tax motivates people to work more. The same level of tax revenues
13For β = 0, scenarios here and in Example 1 coincide. Cf. also the upper left panels in Figures 1 and 2.
16can be generated at a lower labour tax than in the absence of incentive eﬀects. Moreover, when
work disincentives from tax diﬀerentials are very large, tax revenues can only be earned when
the zax rates are suﬃciently close to each other.14 The eﬀect of β on the shape of indiﬀerence
curves looks qualitatively similar as in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows that the optimal capital tax rate decreases monotonically with β. Initially, the
tax rate on labour falls. However, as the transition from the third to the fourth panel shows,
the labour tax rate eventually may increase again. Observe that all optimal tax mixes lie on the
lower and decreasing arc of the iso-budget contours. I.e., tax revenues are increasing in either
tax rate.
Result 3 Suppose that a widening of the gap between labour and capital tax rates depress work
incentives. Starting from weak levels, a stronger tax equity concern calls for a higher tax on
capital and a lower tax on labour. However, if equity concerns become suﬃciently intense,
increasing the labour tax rate may eventually become optimal.
4 Endogenous government expenditure
We now analyze the eﬀects of tax equity concerns when government spending is endogenous.
Such an analysis appears worthwhile since tax equity norms make government activities less
desirable per se: they call for tax mixes that are excessively costly from a pure eﬃciency per-
spective; obedience to tax equity norms increases the marginal costs of public funds. This might
impact on the optimal level of government expenditures – and a ﬁrst intuition would suggest
that greater concerns for tax equity call for smaller governments. But we better have a closer
look.
4.1 Capital taxation and the size of government
We recycle the set-up of Section 2. Again, the government chooses tℓ and tk in order to maximize
social welfare (= indirect utility). Allowing g to vary rather than being preset, the government
objective function reads as
V (tℓ,tk) := (w(r + tk) − tℓ) · L∗(tℓ,tk) − E(L∗(tℓ,tk),ψ(tℓ,tk)) + h(G(tℓ,tk)) − Ω(tℓ,tk) (36)
14In the extreme case when people only care for tax equity, tℓ = tk must hold (for any given tk); otherwise people
would not supply any labour at all.
17where L∗(·) and G(·) are deﬁned as in (12) and (13). Diﬀerentiating V , as deﬁned in (36), with







+ h′(G) · (tℓ + tkk) ·
∂L∗
∂tℓ


















+ h′(G)tkk′L∗ + kΩℓ − Ωk.
These conditions give rise to
Result 4 1. In the absence of tax equity concerns, capital should optimally never be taxed.
2. In the presence of tax equity concerns, whether they shape incentives or just aﬀect utility
levels, a zero tax rate on capital is never optimal.
3. The level of the government-provided good is always15 ineﬃciently low.
The analytical results on the tax structure and their interpretation coincide with those in Sec-
tion 3.1. Also the proof of items 1 and 2 is similar as for Result 1. Consequently, we omit it
(the optimality of a zero tax rate on capital was also proven by Fuest and Huber, 2001).
The under-provision of the government good in the absence of tax equity concerns (i.e., when









Hence, the marginal willingness-to-pay for the government good exceeds the marginal rate of
transformation (which is equal to one). The reason for the under-provision is the ﬁnancing
through a distortionary (labour) tax. When tax equity concerns only aﬀect the level of well-
being (i.e., Ωℓ > 0 = ψℓ), the costs of public funds further increase since government expenditures
will now partly be ﬁnanced through the even less eﬃcient capital tax.
4.2 Comparative statics with level eﬀects
As in the previous section, let us consider the case that the feeling of inequitable taxation has no
incentives eﬀects, i.e., ψk = ψℓ ≡ 0. Only the level eﬀect of tax equity concerns is operative. For
simplicity (and as in Section 3) let us assume that Ω is given by (27): Ω = ˜ Ω(β·(tℓ−tk)). Though
comparative statics get quite messy, some reasonably general results are available. Our ﬁrst
15There is one (immaterial) exception: With exogenous labour supply and in the absence of tax equity concerns,
government expenditures are optimally at their eﬃcient level. This can be seen in (37) when ∂L
∗/∂tℓ = ψℓ =
Ωℓ ≡ 0.
18ﬁnding is in the spirit of Result 2; it holds irrespective of whether labour supply is endogenous
or exogenous:
Result 5 Suppose that tax equity concerns are not too strong initially (i.e., β is positive, but
small).
1. A more intense concern for tax equity, represented by an increase β, calls for a decrease in
the tax rate on labour, an increase in the tax rate on capital and, consequently, a decrease
in the tax rate diﬀerential.
2. The optimal level of government expenditures decreases when concerns for tax equity get
stronger.
The proof of this result is in Appendix 1. From the second item in Result 5, stronger con-
cerns for tax equity call for cutting back the size of the public sector. The intuition appears
straightforward: Capital taxation is economically more costly than labour taxation. When eq-
uity concerns induce the economy to rely more heavily on the less eﬃcient tax instrument, the
(economic) opportunity costs of the government good rise. Consequently, its optimal provision
level decreases.
While Result 5 sounds plausible, a strong caveat has to be added: the qualiﬁcation of only weak
equity concerns made in the proposition is indeed essential. If concerns with tax equity are
strong already, a further intensiﬁcation may call for an increase in labour taxes and/or a rise in
government expenditures. This is illustrated by means of
Example 3: As in Example 1, we choose y = f(k) = kα. To arrive at explicit solutions, we
further suppose that labour supply is inelastic at some level ¯ L > 0. Utility is then measured by
u = c − Ω, where Ω = 0.5β(tℓ − tk)2.
Figure 3 illustrates optimal policies when parameter values are set to ¯ L = 0.2, α = 1/3, and
r = 0.2. The ﬁrst graph shows that β and tk are strictly positively related, as expected.
The other three graphs plot, respectively, (tℓ − tk), tℓ, and optimal government expenditure
G(tℓ(β),tk(β)) against tk – which translates, by the positive association between β and tk from
the ﬁrst graph, into similarly shaped plots against β. As can be seen, tk and the tax rate
diﬀerential (tℓ − tk) move monotonically with β, but the labour tax rate initially falls and later
rises when tax equity concerns intensify beyond some level. This eventual non-monotonicity
of the labour tax rate in the strength of equity considerations may be explained as follows:
With strong equity concerns, the tax rate on capital is quite high and government ﬁnance is
economically quite costly.16 To reduce the economic costs of a further narrowing (demanded by
even stronger equity concerns) in the tax gap may then call for a stronger reliance on the labour
















Figure 3: Optimal policies when government spending is endogenous.
tax, which is lump-sum here. Naturally, the increase in the labour tax must not oﬀset the rise
of the capital tax rate; the tax diﬀerential is bound to decrease.
The fourth graph in Figure 3 shows that also government expenditures are non-monotonic in β,
ﬁrst falling, then rising. The simultaneous increase in both tax rates just explained yields higher
revenues for the government. Thus, the ﬁrst-order intuition that an increase in the marginal
costs of public funds (due to greater reliance on capital taxes, induced by larger equity concerns)
always calls for smaller government is not correct. An equity-induced reduction in the tax spread
may well go along with a larger government budget.
Result 6 In spite of a greater reliance of government ﬁnance on capital taxes, stronger tax
equity concerns may call for an expansion of government expenditures.
Of course, Result 5 remains valid in that government expenditure is always ineﬃciently low in
the presence of equity concerns, even though it may increase once equity concerns get stronger.17
The upper left panel in Figure 3 depicts a positive relationship between the strength of equity
concerns and the optimal capital tax rate. Other than the eﬀects shown in the remaining three
panels, this relationship is indeed general in the case of exogenous labour supply, but not in the
case of endogenous labour supply:
17In the example, an inelastic labour supply is assumed. Hence, the third item in Result 3 does not strictly apply
(see previous footnote). Rather, in the example G is at its eﬃcient level for β = 0: we have G = 0.25, which
solves 1 = h
′(G) = 0.5G
−0.5.
20Result 7 1. For endogenous government spending and exogenous labour supply, a stronger
concern with tax equity always calls for an increase in the capital tax rate.
2. For endogenous government spending but endogenous labour supply, a stronger concern
with tax equity may call for a lower tax rate on capital. A necessary (but insuﬃcient)
condition for this to occur is that the labour supply function is strictly convex in the net
wage (i.e., ∂2ℓS/∂w2 > 0).18
The proof is in Appendix 2. Result 7 shows that the a priori intuition that a higher degree of
tax equity calls for higher taxes on capital is only true for exogenous labour supply. For variable
labour supply, a stronger concern for tax equity may also be associated with lower taxes on
capital income, given that the labour supply function is suﬃciently convex in the net wage. The
reason is the following: With relatively strong concerns for tax equity the capital tax rate will
optimally be positive (see Result 4). Even stronger equity concerns call for further narrowing
the spread between labour and capital taxes. One way to achieve this is to cut back both tax
rates, but with a larger reduction in the labour tax rate. Such tax cuts will increase the gross
wage (lowering tk boosts k), the net wage (w − tℓ rises), indirect utility V , and ﬁnally labour
supply (both via the standard wage eﬀect and the reduced disincentive by the smaller tax gap).
If these eﬀects are strong enough (here the convexity requirement jumps in), such a move need
not reduce, and may even increase, government expenditure, rendering the joint tax cut indeed
feasible and optimal. Recall, however, the necessary requirements: strong equity concerns and
a highly elastic labour supply.
With invariant labour supply, only the comparative statics for the capital tax rates are un-
ambiguously characterized in Result 7. All other comparative statics depend on the sign and
magnitude of k′′, i.e., on the curvature of the capital demand function or, which is the same,
on the third derivative of the production function f(k). In addition, the case of an endogenous
labour supply entails a complex interaction between equity and eﬃciency eﬀects: Closing the
spread between labour and capital tax rates increases labour supply via reduced disincentives
for work. On the other hand, it also raises the excess burden of taxation, due to the mobility
of capital. These opposing eﬀects make it virtually impossible to arrive at any predictions of
at least moderate generality when fairness concerns are strong and labour supply is exogenous.
However, Example 3 shows that counter-intuitive eﬀects may arise already when labour supply
is ﬁxed; by a continuity argument they cannot be excluded in case of an endogenous labour
supply either.
18In our model, this convexity condition is equivalent to the marginal disutility from labour being concave: further





In this paper, we augmented a standard model for factor taxation in small open economies by
concerns about tax equity. Violating standard neoclassical assumptions, we endowed individuals
with direct preferences over tax rates, allowing for a distinction between equity considerations
that shape work incentives and such that just scale up or down utility levels. Optimal tax policies
have to balance three policy goals: (i) maintaining a solid capital base in spite of international
mobility, (ii) generating suﬃciently high tax revenue, and (iii) avoiding large imbalances between
capital and labour taxation.
The third requirement upsets the standard recommendation of exempting capital from tax-
ation. Moreover, our comparative statics reveal some unexpected non-monotonicities: With
weak concerns about tax equity the tax on capital should be higher and the tax on labour and
(endogenous) government expenditures should be lower, relative to an economy that is uncon-
cerned with tax equity. However, with intense concerns for tax equity these intuitive patterns
turn out to be unstable: capital taxes might decrease, labour taxes increase, and government
expenditure go up.
The potential implications of concerns for tax equity on the optimal structure of factor income
taxation can be substantial. Moreover, they vary considerably with the strength of equity
motives. Yet, while from the arguments provided in the introduction (justice principles, fairness
considerations, relative deprivation, envy, etc.) the prevalence of such equity concerns appears
highly plausible, we can at present not provide any measurable evidence for their intensity. We
hope that by demonstrating the potential policy relevance of equity concerns, we shall encourage
empirical work on the subject.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Result 5
Tax rates (item 1)
From (27), Ωℓβ = −Ωkβ = ˜ Ω′ + β(tℓ − tk)˜ Ω′′ > 0. Using (37) and (38), the comparative statics
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˜ Ω′ + β · (tℓ − tk) · ˜ Ω′′
 
· (Vℓℓ + Vkk + 2Vℓk). (42)
Here,
D := VℓℓVkk − V 2
ℓk (43)
25is the determinant of the matrix on the LHS of (28). In a welfare maximum, D > 0 as well as
Vkk,Vℓℓ < 0. From (27), Ωℓℓ = Ωkk = −Ωℓk = β2˜ Ω′′ > 0. The claims in item 1 of Result 5 are,
thus, proven if (but not only if) Vℓk < 0.19
As an intermediate result (which will also be helpful in the proof of item 2) we report:
Vℓk = kVℓℓ + A1 (44)





Ltkk′ − h′(G)tkk′ ∂ℓ
∂w





+ h′(G)L(2k′ + tkk′′)
−(k + 1)β2˜ Ω′′ − h′k′ ∂ℓ
∂w
(tℓ + tkk) − k′L. (47)
Equations (44) and (45) are proven below.
From Result 3 we get that tk = 0 for β = 0. Hence, A1 = 0 in this case. However, then




dβ > 0, and
d(tℓ−tk)
dβ < 0. By continuity, the same holds for small positive values of β (and, thus, tk).  

























































Recall that Gℓ > 0 in an optimum.20 Hence, dG




dβ < 0. Verify that,












˜ Ω′ + β · (tℓ − tk) · ˜ Ω′′
 

















˜ Ω′ + β · (tℓ − tk) · ˜ Ω′′
 
. (48)
19In fact, this condition is overly strict. It would suﬃce that Vℓk < max{−Vℓℓ,−Vkk}.
20 See (37) and (38): Conditions Vℓ = Vk = 0 require that Gℓ > 0 and Gk −
1
h′Ωk > 0, respectively.
26In (48) both the square-bracketed expression and D are positive. Moreover, using the deﬁnition
of D in (43) and, again, (44) and (45) and the fact that A1 = 0 at β = 0,
D = Vℓℓ(A2 − kA1) − A2
1 = VℓℓA2.
As Vℓℓ < 0 in an optimum, D being positive necessitates A2 < 0. In turn, we get that (48) is
negative and, thus, dG
dβ < 0 at β = 0. Again, by continuity, this also holds for β > 0, but small.
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= kVℓℓ + A1.
27With A1 as deﬁned in (46), this is (44). Finally,
Vkk = w′ ∂L
∂tk
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= kVℓk + A2.
With A2 as deﬁned in (47), this coincides with (45).  
Appendix 2: Proof of Result 7
Exogenous labour supply (item 1)
From (41), dtk/dβ is opposite in sign to Vℓℓ+Vℓk. Using (44), we get that Vℓℓ+Vℓk = (1+k)Vℓℓ+
A1. With exogenous labour supply, (46) gives A1 = h′′(G)L2tkk′+(k+1)β2˜ Ω′′. Moreover, from
(49), Vℓℓ = h′′(G)L2 − β2˜ Ω′′ when labour supply is exogenous. Hence,
Vℓℓ + Vℓk = h′′(G)L2(1 + k + tkk′) = h′′(G)L(Gℓ + Gk) < 0,
where we used (15) and (14) and exploited that from (32), it follows that






must be positive in an inner solution.21 Thus, dtk/dβ > 0.  
21See also footnote 20. Note that in (32) we have to substitute for λ with h
′ to obtain the analogue for endogenous
government spending.
28Endogenous labour supply (item 2)
From (41) and 44, sign[dtk/dβ] = −sign[(1 + k)Vℓℓ + A1]. With endogenous labour supply, (49)
and (46) give
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Here we used that Ωkk = −Ωℓℓ. The ﬁrst and second term on the RHS of (51) are negative
since h′ > 1, Gℓ > 0 and Gℓ + Gk > 0 must hold in an inner optimum. The sign of the third
term in (51) can be determined from (15), (14) and (50) which yield that L(1 + k + tkk′) =
Gℓ + Gk + ∂ℓ
∂w(tℓ + tkk)(1 + k) > 0. Thus, ∂2ℓ/∂w2 < 0 is suﬃcient for (51) to be negative and,
thus, for dtk/dβ > 0.  
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